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Improving Technology Neutrality  
Through Compulsory Licensing 
Jake Linford† 
In Rethinking Technology Neutrality,1 Brad Greenberg 
raises the provocative possibility that the principle of 
technology neutrality embedded in the Copyright Act of 1976 
aims at worthwhile goals, but actually stymies the achievement 
of those objectives. Greenberg posits that technology 
neutrality’s laudable dual purposes of future-proofing the 
Copyright Act and promoting equivalent treatment of old and 
new technologies vis-à-vis copyright liability are thwarted by 
four heretofore under-recognized problems. First, it is difficult 
to predict the costs of subjecting new tech to old copyright laws. 
Second, innovators face an unclear penumbra of protection that 
increases precisely because Congress will mistakenly assume 
tech neutral laws need no updating. Third, so-called neutral 
application likely varies depending on the perspective and 
approach of the judges that construe relevant statutory 
language. Fourth, technology neutrality may be little more 
than a pretense because so-called “neutrality” favors 
incumbents over innovators.  
Greenberg argues that Congress should replace the 
expansive scope of technology neutrality with a broad right to 
economic exploitation of a copyrighted work in a variety of 
specific technology categories, which would improve technology 
tailoring of copyright law. As part of that change, Greenberg 
imagines an increased role for an administrative agency in 
updating the scope of copyright law. In addition, Greenberg’s 
reimagined copyright act would require a compulsory license 
for new technologies that do not fit within a specific technology 
category—a mandated midpoint between no-liability fair use 
and the business-ending injunctive relief that often 
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 1. Brad A. Greenberg, Rethinking Technology Neutrality, 100 MINN. L. 
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accompanies a property right.2 
Even if Congress could be motivated to enact Greenberg’s 
proposed changes, this shift to technology specificity and 
technological discrimination would not solve the identified 
problems as completely as he hopes. But his article points a 
way forward: courts can become more aware of the problems of 
technology neutrality and confront them more directly when 
assessing the scope of copyright protection against 
unauthorized uses via new technological interventions. Doing 
so may mitigate the current tendency to make every copyright 
lawsuit a fight about the transformative and disruptive nature 
of the technology at issue. In addition, when a useful new 
technology exploits copyrighted expression, courts might 
properly avoid the extremes of injunctive relief or no liability 
and instead award remedies like Greenberg’s compulsory 
license. 
I.  RETHINKING TECHNOLOGY NEUTRALITY 
Technology neutrality, simply stated, is an approach that 
regulates behavior rather than technology.3 In the context of 
the Copyright Act of 1976, technology neutrality is most clearly 
embodied in section 102(a),4 which states that copyright 
subsists in “any tangible medium of expression, now known or 
later developed.”5 Technology neutrality also manifests in many 
of the Act’s definitions,6 and in the rights granted to copyright 
 
 2. Cf. Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty 
Stacking, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1991, 2009 (2007) (“In the real world, it is common 
for patent defendants to settle cases for more money than the patentee could 
have won in damages and license fees, simply to avoid the threat of an 
injunction shutting down the core product.”); Abraham Bell & Gideon 
Parchomovsky, Pliability Rules, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1, 31 (2002) (“[T]he fair use 
doctrine in copyright law reduces the usual property rule protection to zero 
order liability protection where the use of the copyright entitlement 
constitutes a ‘fair use.’”). 
 3. Greenberg, supra note 1, at 1521. 
 4. Id. at 1515. 
 5. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012). 
 6. Greenberg, supra note 1, at 1515. See e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (“To 
‘perform’ a work means to recite, render, play, dance, or act it, either directly 
or by means of any device or process . . . ..”). See also Copyright Law Revision: 
Hearings on H.R. 4347, H.R. 5680, H.R. 6381, and H.R. 6835 Before the 
Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties & the Admin. of Justice of the H. Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 89th Cong. 32–33 (1965) (noting that the Act adopts 
technology neutral definitions to avoid “confining the scope of an author’s 
rights on the basis of present technology”). 
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owners.7 As Greenberg explains, both the text and context of 
the Copyright Act suggest that Congress intended to enact 
legislation that reaches infringing activity whether or not 
Congress could have contemplated the technology used to 
infringe when it drafted the statute.8 
Technology neutrality is often touted as good policy.9 
Advocates of technology neutrality in copyright law emphasize 
that a technology neutral statute should be somewhat future 
proof—adaptable to new technologies even if the enacting 
Congress couldn’t hazard a guess at what those technologies 
might be. Congress thus seems to have collectively presumed 
that a technology neutral statute would need less frequent 
updating than a technology specific statute.10 In addition, a 
technology neutral statute should be applied evenly to 
equivalent technologies (or perhaps across the board to all 
technologies). Even-handed application seems, at least on the 
surface, more equitable than other options. 
But Greenberg takes a deep look at technology neutrality 
as it operates in the Copyright Act and does not like what he 
sees. In fact, Greenberg proposes that future proofing might not 
always be desirable.11 A future proof statute sets a normative 
baseline, but norms can shift. If current norms have moved 
away from the norms embodied in the statute, then technology 
neutrality may cause a problematic normative lock-in. 
In addition, Greenberg argues that true technology 
neutrality might be unobtainable for four interlocking reasons. 
First, a technology neutral regime commits to treat new 
 
 7. Greenberg, supra note 1, at 1515. See e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 
63 (1976) (explaining how the author’s exclusive right, under 17 U.S.C. 
§ 106(4), to perform or transmit a work publicly, can occur by means of devices 
“not yet in use or even invented”). 
 8. Greenberg, supra note 1, at 1514–18. See also e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 94-
1476, at 52 (1976) (noting that technology neutrality was adopted to “avoid the 
artificial and largely unjustifiable distinctions . . . under which statutory 
copyrightability in certain cases has been made to depend upon the form or 
medium in which the work is fixed”); id. at 53 (explaining that if the work of 
authorship is a “literary work,” the copies or phonorecords could take any 
form, “including books, periodicals, computer punch cards, microfilm, tape 
recordings, and so forth”). 
 9. Carys J. Craig, Technological Neutrality: (Pre)Serving the Purposes of 
Copyright Law, in THE COPYRIGHT PENTALOGY: HOW THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CANADA SHOOK THE FOUNDATIONS OF CANADIAN COPYRIGHT 271, 272–73 
(Geist ed., 2013) (summarizing arguments in favor of technology neutrality). 
 10. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
 11. See Greenberg, supra note 1, at 1523. 
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technologies as subject to copyright even though Congress 
likely fails to predict the cost of extending protection in this 
way. Technology neutrality may cause courts to treat 
substantively different technologies as alike, even though new 
technologies might be less analogous to old technologies than 
they initially appear. For example, a new technology might 
impose lower costs on copyright owners and provide greater 
benefits to consumers than older technologies it resembles.12 
Indeed, copyright owners are often criticized for short-
sightedness in opposing the use of copyrighted works in new 
technologies.13 Applying copyright liability to a new technology 
might therefore impose a higher-than-predicted cost on 
innovators and consumers.14 
Second, a technology neutral regime has fuzzy 
boundaries—a penumbra where interpretation is most difficult 
because it is unclear whether the law should apply.15 For 
technology neutral laws, the fuzzy part of the boundary may be 
particularly broad. But because technology neutrality 
supposedly prevents the need for frequent updating, 
technologists and copyright owners may spend too long 
litigating cases in the twilight of the Copyright Act’s useful 
life.16 
Third, technology neutrality may be in the eye of the 
beholder. Greenberg observes courts often replace the 
technology neutral framework that Congress enacted with a 
technology specific calculus. For instance, while Napster, 
Aimster, and Grokster all provided users with the means to 
download music without paying copyright owners, courts 
looked beyond the similarities in those systems and found 
different bases for liability, in part because differences in 
design persuaded the courts that different legal doctrines must 
apply.17 The breadth of technology neutrality may thus leave 
parties in the uncomfortable position of not knowing how a case 
 
 12. Id. at 1510, 1523. 
 13. See, e.g., Jessica Litman, The Story of Sony v. Universal Studios: Mary 
Poppins Meets the Boston Strangler, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STORIES 358, 
383 (Jane C. Ginsburg & Rochelle C. Dreyfuss eds., 2006) (despite opposing 
the Sony Betamax, “the motion picture industry grew to rely on the pre-
recorded videocassette market as a significant source of its income”). 
 14. Greenberg, supra note 1, at 1524–29, 1546. 
 15. Id. at 1529 (citing H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law 
and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593, 607–08 (1958)). 
 16. Id. at 1529–36. 
 17. Id. at 1540–42. 
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will turn out because the outcome will often depend on the 
perspective of the members of the court, and their sometimes 
disparate approaches when analogizing new technologies to 
old.18 
Fourth, if one thinks of neutrality as providing equal 
opportunities for business models built on new and old 
technologies to make productive use of copyrighted expression, 
neutrality may only be a pretense. Technology neutrality is not 
value neutral; the presumption that copyright should extend to 
new business models may overprotect incumbent business 
models built on old technology, discriminate against new 
technology, and prevent useful competition by new entrants.19 
If Greenberg is correct, true technology neutrality is 
effectively unobtainable. And when technology neutrality fails, 
interested parties successfully petition Congress for technology 
specific provisions that undermine the technology neutral 
framework on which our copyright laws supposedly depend. 
Those technology specific provisions are often thorny and 
impenetrable, helpful only to the interested parties who lobbied 
for them, and useless for updating the law.20 So technology 
neutrality is likely to fail, and its failure is likely to produce the 
worst possible instances of technology specificity. 
Given the flaws Greenberg perceives with technology 
neutrality, he proposes that we abandon the formalism of 
technology neutrality in order to receive the benefits it purports 
to give us. To that end, he argues that Congress should rewrite 
the Copyright Act with an eye toward a form of technology 
specificity he calls technological discrimination.21 Greenberg’s 
technological discrimination is a hybrid between technology 
neutrality and technology specificity, which he sees as 
antipodal extremes at the ends of a spectrum of policy options. 
Instead of granting exclusive rights to authors to copy, 
distribute, adapt, and publicly perform and display copyrighted 
works in any medium or through any technology,22 Greenberg 
envisions a revised copyright act that would grant an “exclusive 
 
 18. Id. at 1536–43. 
 19. Id. at 1543–46. 
 20. Id. at 1516 (discussing 17 U.S.C. § 111 (2012), a compulsory license for 
cable retransmission that is available only to technologies that fit within its 
narrow definitions). 
 21. Id. at 1548. 
 22. Those are the exclusive rights currently extended to copyright owners. 
17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012). 
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right to exploitation of the copyrighted work in [specific] 
covered technologies.”23 Covered technologies would be those 
substantively equivalent to technologies in defined statutory 
categories. For example, the proposed revision would protect a 
right to exploit the work using technology substantively 
equivalent to devices currently used “for recording audiovisual 
works, like video cassette recorders or cameras”; or “devices for 
communicating audiovisual works to the public, like broadcast 
or cable transmission technologies.”24 This technological 
discrimination approach would encourage courts to consider the 
costs and benefits of extending the scope of copyright protection 
to new technologies. 
In addition, Congress would task administrative experts 
with determining whether or not a new, potentially infringing 
technology is equivalent to a defined technological category. 
Greenberg imagines that in many cases, copyright protection 
would extend to the new technology. Furthermore, in most 
cases where a new technology doesn’t fit into a specified 
category, the technologist would pay a compulsory license, set 
by the same administrative agency. This license would provide 
a revenue stream to an injured copyright owner, but forestall 
the owner from shutting down a new technology or demanding 
its preferred licensing rate. Greenberg posits these changes 
would improve technology tailoring in copyright law. 
Greenberg is mostly right. Technology neutrality has 
significant limitations, and courts should directly confront 
them when resolving disputes over alleged infringement 
enabled by new technology. But unfortunately, even if Congress 
could be persuaded to enact the aforementioned proposals, 
moving to a more technology specific copyright act would fail to 
correct many of the problems that Greenberg attributes to 
technology neutrality. However, as this response argues briefly 
below, courts could be bolder in applying something like 
Greenberg’s compulsory license at the remedies phase. 
II.  THE PROBLEMS WITH TECHNOLOGY SPECIFICITY 
This Part summarizes Greenberg’s important insights 
about four critical problems with technology neutrality—
prediction, penumbra, perspective, and pretense. 
Unfortunately, Greenberg’s proposed technological 
 
 23. Greenberg, supra note 1, at 1549. 
 24. Id. 
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discrimination regime would not mitigate these problems as 
effectively as he hopes. Greenberg is correct that Congress 
struggles to predict the cost of treating new technologies like 
existing technology. But a statutory shift from behavior-based 
exclusive rights regardless of technology to a general right of 
economic exploitation in narrow technological categories 
threatens to preserve the technological mindset embedded in 
the Act without correcting the mismatch between technological 
similarity and technological cost. 
His proposal similarly trades the problem of penumbra—
fuzziness at the edge of the statutory boundary—for a plethora 
of penumbrae. Providing narrow technology-based protections 
may encourage subsequent redrafting by Congress, but courts 
will face difficult interpretive challenges when comparing a 
new technology to multiple potentially relevant technology 
categories irrespective of how often Congress updates them. 
Likewise, Greenberg notes that judicial decisions 
frequently turn on whether the court focuses on the structure of 
the allegedly infringing technology, or its output. The proposed 
statutory fix doesn’t directly address this problem of 
perspective. It merely shifts the costs from courts to Congress 
or administrators. 
Finally, Greenberg correctly identifies that technology 
neutrality is not value neutral. Indeed, treating new technology 
like old technology may discriminate against subsequent 
innovations. But this deliberate policy choice is not a pretense; 
neutral applicability of the statute to old and new technology is 
consistent with Congressional intent, and within the scope of 
the legislature’s constitutional authority as the Supreme Court 
defines it. 
A. PREDICTION AND THE “TECHNOLOGICAL MINDSET” 
As Greenberg reminds us, experts are terrible at predicting 
the next big thing.25 For example, the Internet has proven to be 
a transformative communications technology, but it was first 
envisioned as a way to remotely share processing power from 
idle computers.26 Congress is likely much less capable of 
correctly predicting the future. The difficulty of prediction 
motivates technology neutrality. A technology neutral statute 
 
 25. Id. at 1525. 
 26. See, e.g., MICHAEL BANKS, ON THE WAY TO THE WEB: THE SECRET 
HISTORY OF THE INTERNET AND ITS FOUNDERS 181 (2012). 
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is drafted broadly because it is hard to imagine what the next 
generation of technologies might look like. The current 
Copyright Act deals with the predictive failure by not dealing 
with it. Instead, the Act is presumed to govern uses of the 
copyrighted work in new technologies, “whether now known or 
later developed.”27 
But Greenberg notes a second level of predictive failure. 
Congress is like the farmer who can imagine a sharper plow—a 
linear development from known technology—but not a 
technological discontinuity like the combustion engine.28 The 
Internet is another technological discontinuity likely 
unimaginable when the Copyright Act of 1976 was drafted and 
enacted. The printing (or pressing) and distribution of bootleg 
books or vinyl albums is not analogous to how information is 
transmitted and used over the Internet; neither is a radio or 
television broadcast. Greenberg thus observes that Congress is 
not only incapable of predicting what technologies are beyond 
the horizon, but it cannot know whether applying copyright law 
to these new technologies “will promote—or undermine—the 
law’s policy goals.”29 A technology specific Copyright Act might 
ameliorate that limitation by requiring more frequent 
updating, which could encourage or even require Congress to 
consider these questions on a more regular basis.30 
Indeed, Greenberg locates some of the problem of 
prediction in the exclusive 106 rights themselves.31 Exclusive 
rights to copy, adapt, distribute, and publicly perform and 
display a copyrighted work presume technologically specific 
boundaries between the rights. But new technologies collapse 
the borders between rights.32 And litigating one of the 106 
 
 27. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012). 
 28. Greenberg, supra note 1, at 1527. 
 29. Id. at 1526. 
 30. See, e.g., Hon. M. Margaret McKeown, Happy Birthday Statute of 
Anne: The Dance Between the Courts and Congress, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
1145, 1152–53 (2010) (describing how narrow judicial opinions may prompt 
Congress to update the Copyright Act). Congress, however, will sometimes 
defer to the courts on just these types of questions. For example, Congress 
contemplated revising the Copyright Act to legalize home video recording, but 
instead waited for the Supreme Court’s opinion in Sony v. Universal. Litman, 
supra note 13, at 365–66 (citing H.R. 5488, 97th Cong. (1982); S. Amdt. 1242 
to S. 1758, 97th Cong. (1981); H.R. 5705, 97th Cong. (1982); S. Amdt. 1333 to 
S. 1758, 97th Cong. (1982)). 
 31. Greenberg, supra note 1, at 1528. 
 32. Id. (quoting United States v. Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors and 
Publishers, 627 F.3d 64, 74 n.10 (2d Cir. 2010) (“[U]nder certain circumstances 
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rights without discussing any of the others might “invite[] 
technological manipulation designed to skirt liability while 
engaging in practices that do not conform to the spirit of the 
law.”33 This “technological mindset,” anchoring the technology 
neutrality in the current act to old technologies, threatens to 
leave infringement through “substantively equivalent 
technologies and business models” unremedied.34 
Unfortunately, Greenberg’s proposed statutory revision—
protecting the right of copyright owners to economic 
exploitation of the work in covered technologies—does not move 
copyright law away from the technological mindset. Indeed, 
explicitly anchoring scope of protection to narrowly defined 
technology categories may embed the technological mindset 
more deeply into the copyright regime. In addition, building a 
regime that relies on frequent updating will likely increase the 
risk faced by copyright holders who may find themselves 
waiting on an administrative agency for confirmation that they 
have a right deserving a remedy.35 
B. A PLETHORA OF PENUMBRAE 
Greenberg also explains how technology neutrality can 
exacerbate a different sort of interpretive problem. H.L.A. Hart 
offered a famous hypothetical illustrating the difficulty of 
construing statutory language: how should one interpret the 
term “vehicles” in a statute, “no vehicles in the park.” 
Construing the term broadly might ban ambulances, which one 
might prefer to enter the park, at least during emergencies;36 or 
baby strollers, which might not have fallen within legislative 
intent, but might nevertheless count as vehicles.37 The 
difficulty with narrowing the definition is that the simple 
statutory language provides no hints for how to do so. The 
interpreter must turn to other information, including intuitions 
about what vehicle might mean, historical context of the park 
 
. . . a transmission could constitute both a stream and a download, each of 
which implicates a different right of the copyright holder.”)). 
 33. Greenberg, supra note 1, at 1529. 
 34. Id. at 1528. 
 35. Cf. Jake Linford, A Second Look at the Right of First Publication, 58 J. 
COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 585, 587 (2011) [hereinafter Linford, First 
Publication] (describing how new technologies can dramatically shift risks of 
infringement and enable market-decimating exploitation of copyrighted 
expression). 
 36. Greenberg, supra note 1, at 1529–30. 
 37. Id. at 1530. 
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and “vehicle” use therein, and legislative history. 
Hart posited that interpretive questions are most difficult 
at the penumbra—those cases where the connection between 
the term of art (“vehicle”) and the regulated thing or behavior 
(strollers) are not so tenuous as to be easily dismissed, but not 
so clear as to be readily embraced. Greenberg argues that 
technology neutrality exacerbates this problem because the 
penumbra around technology neutral language expands as the 
law ages.38 He posits this expansion occurs for two reasons. I 
address them here in reverse order. First, technology neutral 
drafting creates the illusion that the law can survive with less 
frequent updates. Greenberg posits this illusion of adaptability 
will lead to ossification, because legislators mistakenly 
conclude the law is relatively future-proof. Thus, corrections 
will happen in a piecemeal fashion, rather than holistically.39 A 
technology specific statute might prevent some ossification 
because Congress cannot be easily persuaded that a technology 
specific statute can carry on without frequent updating.40 
Second, compared to a technology specific provision, a 
technology neutral law must speak in broad generalities. A 
general statute like “no vehicles in the park” must be 
reinterpreted as new vehicle-like technologies like the Segway 
or the drone are invented. Statutory interpretation in the 
penumbra is difficult and prone to error. Greenberg argues that 
a technology specific statute, like “no skateboards in the park,” 
provides more clarity about its intended boundaries, potentially 
reducing the scope of the penumbra.41 
The problem of the penumbra presented itself in the recent 
litigation over the Aereo business model. Aereo retransmitted 
broadcast television signals to customers, a business model 
that looks much like the cable model that Congress subjected to 
a compulsory license.42 But Aereo sought to work around 
copyright liability by using a bank of tiny antennae to capture 
individual signals for individual subscribers. The redundancy 
 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 1531. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 1530. 
 42. 17 U.S.C. § 111 (2012). Under that compulsory license, the owners of 
copyright cannot prohibit cable operators from retransmitting on-the-air 
broadcasts, but the cable operators must observe certain formalities and pay a 
government specified royalty. 
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was designed to circumvent the public performance right.43 
When broadcasters sued to block Aereo, courts struggled with 
broad definitions of “the public” and “transmission” in the 
Copyright Act. Greenberg argues that new technologies like 
Aereo’s antenna bank “enlarge the area of uncertainty by 
creating questions that legislators did not imagine were 
technologically possible.”44 
Greenberg worries that in a technology neutral regime, the 
penumbra will expand as technology develops, but technology 
specific statutes are not immune to this pressure. Returning to 
his example of “no skateboards in the park,” consider whether a 
Segway is close enough to a skateboard to fit within its 
penumbra, or whether something like the Hoverboard from 
Back to the Future counts as a skateboard.45 Likewise, instead 
of deciding whether a technology infringes the exclusive right 
to make copies, courts would be tasked with deciding whether a 
new technology is similar enough to one of several defined 
technological categories that its use of a copyrighted work 
infringes the owner’s exclusive right to economic exploitation. 
Indeed, technology specificity may replace one penumbra with 
a plethora of penumbrae. Instead of dealing with a large band 
of uncertainty around technology neutral provisions, courts will 
be tasked with understanding gaps between specific technology 
categories and determining whether a new technology maps 
onto one category or another. In both cases, courts are on the 
horns of the same dilemma: does the current statute cover the 
new technology? Thus, technology specific statutes do not solve 
the problem of penumbra. 
C. PERCEPTIONS OF PERSPECTIVE 
Greenberg returns to the Aereo case to highlight what he 
calls the problem of perspective: when a court considers a 
technology deep within the penumbra, one that Congress could 
not have predicted, the perspective of the court about the 
technology may take an oversized role. Courts might look to the 
structure or operation of new technology, or they might look to 
the output or commercial function of the technology. Those 
 
 43. See Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc. 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014); Greenberg, 
supra note 1 at 1530–31. 
 44. Greenberg, supra note 1, at 1531. 
 45. BACK TO THE FUTURE PART II (Universal Pictures 1989). One company 
now offers a hoverboard that will hover an inch off the ground. See HENDO 
HOVER, http://www.hendohover.com (last visited Aug. 8, 2016). 
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distinctly different frames of reference can drive litigation 
outcomes.46 
For example, in Aereo, a majority of justices joined Justice 
Breyer in concluding that Aereo infringed the public 
performance right in the copyrighted works it retransmitted. In 
so concluding, Justice Breyer looked past the structure of the 
antenna set up, concluding that Aereo had the same 
“commercial objectives” as cable companies, and consumers had 
effectively the same experience as cable customers.47 From 
Justice Breyer’s perspective, the output of the Aereo system 
was just like the output of a cable system. Thus, the Copyright 
Act applied to Aereo’s transmission. 
Justice Scalia saw things differently. His dissenting 
opinion took a structural perspective. The structure of the 
antenna system, with each subscriber receiving a signal from 
an assigned antenna, moved Aereo out of a public performance, 
because the transmission was one-to-one. This structural 
perspective led Scalia to conclude that consumers, rather than 
Aereo, transmitted the performance.48 
Greenberg argues that the Act’s technology neutrality 
makes the distinction between structure and output too 
important. Greenberg amasses significant evidence that 
Congress likely intended courts to apply a behaviorist, output-
focused perspective, although the statutory language does not 
explicitly address the issue of perspective.49 But he 
acknowledges that while more specificity about the proper 
frame of reference could mitigate the problem of perspective, 
the problem would persist.50 
In addition, Greenberg perceives the 106 rights as 
contributing to the problem of perspective. Those rights—
copying, creating derivative works, distributing copies, and 
performing and displaying publicly—embed a then-
contemporary understanding of how authors and owners might 
exploit their copyright. Gaps in coverage between 106 rights 
become apparent as new technologies arise because those 106 
rights are anchored in old technologies. Aereo’s exploited new 
technology and an old understanding of signal reception to 
 
 46. Greenberg, supra note 1, at 1537. 
 47. Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2508. 
 48. Id. at 2514 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“In sum, Aereo does not ‘perform’ 
for the sole and simple reason that it does not make the choice of content.”). 
 49. Greenberg, supra note 1, at 1542. 
 50. Id. 
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build a business model that skirted the edges of copying and 
performance, fitting squarely into neither concept and thus 
potentially infringing neither right.51 
Unfortunately, replacing a technology neutral inquiry into 
infringing activities with a technology specific inquiry into 
whether the defendant infringes an exclusive right to “economic 
exploitation” of a covered technology or its close equivalents 
doesn’t cleanly solve this problem. The problem of perspective 
would persist in a technology specific statutory regime as well. 
Questions of structure versus output would linger. A statute 
that secures the right to economic exploitation in a covered 
category like devices for recording audiovisual works such as 
video recorders or cameras, would still leave courts with a 
choice between a structural inspection of the internal workings 
of the new technology and a behavioral examination of the 
allegedly infringing output. And Greenberg’s proposed revision, 
which extends exclusive rights to exploit the copyrighted work 
in covered technologies and those “substantially equivalent” to 
those covered,52 provides no guidance on whether to apply a 
structural or behavioral perspective in discerning substantial 
equivalence. 
D. PRETENSE AND PHRASEOLOGY 
Greenberg’s final problem with technology neutrality is 
that its neutrality may be a pretense. Technology neutrality is 
shaped by social and political context, and requires a decision 
in the first instance about which technologies and rights set the 
purportedly neutral baseline. Extending copyright law to new 
technologies is thus not a value neutral proposition. Setting 
any statutory baseline requires making value judgments as 
part of that process. Nevertheless, while it is crucial to 
recognize the values baked into technology neutrality, those 
determinations do not strip technology neutrality of its equal 
application. 
Greenberg is correct to highlight the mismatch between 
value neutrality and technology neutrality, but to presume 
value neutrality from technology neutrality is the fundamental 
error. As Greenberg’s summary of the legislative history 
explains, Congress intended to make a broadly applicable 
copyright law that would reach new technology. The decision is 
 
 51. Id. at 1538–39. 
 52. Id. at 1549. 
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not value neutral, but it is neutral in the sense that it applies 
equally to every technology, if that technology is used to 
infringe one of the exclusive rights granted to the copyright 
owner. This neutral applicability was not accidental, although 
there are public policy reasons to wonder whether the choice 
was well-taken.53 
In addition, a counter-factual regime in which Congress 
eschewed neutral applicability would be equally value laden, 
and likely aimed at a different goal than the goal animating the 
technology neutral provisions of the 1976 Act. If copyright 
owners were required to petition Congress or an agency to 
reach any new infringing technology, the law would 
discriminate against IP owners, against standing business 
models, and against prior technologists who may have paid to 
play.54 
More generally, it is not clear that Greenberg’s critique is 
specific to technology neutrality. It rather aims at a prior 
question—what is the scope of Congress’s authority to set 
copyright law’s policy goals? If, as Greenberg teaches us, 
Congress intended to draft an act that takes as its default 
extending copyright protection to reach infringing activity 
implemented through new technology, then technology 
neutrality may promote the goal. At a minimum, it may not be 
an unintended consequence.55 
Should Congress be empowered to decide which policy 
goals to aim for with the scope of copyright protection? The 
Supreme Court deflected two recent challenges to 
Congressional authority to extend the duration of copyright 
 
 53. See, e.g., Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Foreseeability and Copyright 
Incentives, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1569, 1589–91 (2009) (arguing that content 
owners “clearly are not best positioned to develop” new markets for existing 
works); Greenberg, supra note 1, at 1545 (arguing that “technology neutrality 
entangles granting authors exclusive control over exploitation of their work 
with protecting existing markets from new markets of exploitation [which] 
imposes social costs without necessarily conferring benefits to authors”). 
 54. Linford, First Publication, supra note 35, at 623 (observing that a 
policy of denying rights incidental to those rights that directly incentivized the 
creation of copyrightable expression would “at its extreme . . . lead to a string 
of property rights derived from the same underlying creative act scattered 
among successive technological innovators”). 
 55. Id. at 629–32 (explaining how Congress imported from the common 
law right of first publication—and the Court affirmed—a right of market entry 
broad enough to allow a copyright owner to decide if and when to have its 
work exploited in a given medium). 
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protection,56 and to the renewal of protection to copyrighted 
works for which protection had expired due to a failure to 
observe formalities, among other reasons.57 Scholars have 
argued there should be some limit on Congressional authority 
in these contexts.58 But the Supreme Court has articulated only 
three limits on copyright protection that Congress may not 
alter: the idea-expression line that bars extending copyright 
protection to ideas;59 protection from liability for fair uses;60 
and eventual expiration of copyright protection.61 Technology 
neutrality’s purported problem of pretense crosses none of 
those impermeable thresholds. Greenberg provides a strong 
argument for why we could construe technology neutrality as 
bad policy, but not as constitutionally impermissible. Congress 
is allowed to select a statutory regime, even if it is 
unfortunately short-sighted.62 
D. TAKEAWAYS 
What should we take from Greenberg’s description of the 
 
 56. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 222 (2003) (“Beneath the facade of 
their inventive constitutional interpretation, petitioners forcefully urge that 
Congress pursued very bad policy in prescribing the CTEA’s long terms. The 
wisdom of Congress’ action, however, is not within our province to second-
guess.”). 
 57. Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 878 (2012) (“Neither the Copyright 
and Patent Clause nor the First Amendment, we hold, makes the public 
domain, in any and all cases, a territory that works may never exit.”). 
 58. See, e.g., Jake Linford, The Institutional Progress Clause, 16 VAND. J. 
ENT. & TECH. L. 533, 559 (2014) [hereinafter Linford, Progress Clause]. 
 59. Id. at 559 (“[T]he Progress Clause builds in a natural limit recognized 
by the courts, as articulated in the idea-expression dichotomy.”). 
 60. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 219–20 (2003) (“[C]opyright law contains built-in 
First Amendment accommodations” allowing free use of ideas and providing a 
fair use defense, which “affords considerable ‘latitude for scholarship and 
comment’”) (quoting Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 
U.S. 539, 560 (1985)). Cf. Neil Weinstock Netanel, First Amendment 
Constraints on Copyright After Golan v. Holder, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1082, 1103 
(2013) (arguing that although the opinion in Golan narrowly defines the 
traditional contours of copyright protection, it nevertheless “fortifies and gives 
First Amendment import to the idea/expression dichotomy and the fair use 
defense”). 
 61. Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 37 
(2003) (noting that Congress may not “create[] a species of perpetual patent 
[or] copyright”). 
 62. Jessica W. Rice, Note, “The Devil Take the Hindmost”: Copyright’s 
Freedom from Constitutional Constraints After Golan v. Holder, 161 U. PA. L. 
REV. ONLINE 283, 298–300 (2013) (stating Golan “has issued so broad a license 
to Congress that ostensibly there remain no principled constitutional 
safeguards against the public domain’s continued erosion”). 
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problems of technology neutrality? First, these problems are a 
subset of a problem courts face in almost every case, whether 
the law to be applied is common law or statutory. Courts must 
reason by analogy, for instance, in determining whether Aereo’s 
use of copyrighted works is like the use made by cable 
companies, or like the use of a photocopy machine. And of 
course, when a court faces a new technology, decisions made by 
the Supreme Court in Aereo will be among the inputs that help 
the court determine whether copyright protection reaches uses 
of a work by the new technology (whether that technology is 
cloud computing or something else). The common law process of 
reasoning by analogy may or may not lead to efficient outcomes 
in the long run.63 But it is an established part of the American 
legal system. 
Second, technology neutrality might lead Congress to think 
it need not amend the Copyright Act, perhaps because it 
assumes courts can reason by analogy as well in these 
technological contexts as in many others. Here, Greenberg 
weakens his own narrative by noting the frequency with which 
IP-creating industries have successfully obtained technology 
specific provisions.64 Those technology specific provisions, 
however, are often challenging to comprehend, and so narrowly 
tailored that even if they were comprehensible, they provide 
almost no guidance in determining liability for infringement 
through subsequent technological innovations. One might 
therefore reasonably question the benefit of more frequent 
updating. 
In addition, Greenberg is aware of the easiest criticism of 
his proposed statutory reform: Congress can be difficult to 
motivate at the best of times, and right now, copyright reform 
is toxic.65 The last attempt by copyright owners to expand the 
scope of protection was met with significant public hostility.66 
 
 63. Compare e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW 
(7th ed. 2007) (proposing that the common law is efficient), with DAVID A. 
FRIEDMAN, LAW’S ORDER 298–99 (2000) (questioning that claim). 
 64. See, e.g., Greenberg, supra note 1, at 1520. 
 65. See, e.g., Margot E. Kaminski, The Capture of International 
Intellectual Property Law Through the U.S. Trade Regime, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 
977, 1045 (2014) (“Intellectual property enforcement is, [post failed reform], a 
toxic topic in Washington.”); Hayden W. Gregory, The Next Great Copyright 
Act?, 7 LANDSLIDE 2, 59 (2014) (“[F]or several key copyright leaders in 
Congress, the recent catastrophic collapse of . . . legislation aimed at off-shore 
online piracy loomed as a disincentive to taking on bold new initiatives.”). 
 66. Linford, Progress Clause, supra note 58, at 581 (2013) (“While the 
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And while the Copyright Office has begun the process of 
imagining “The Next Great Copyright Act,”67 nothing like 
Greenberg’s technological discrimination regime is dreamed of 
in the current slate of proposals. We are in for a long wait if we 
must wait for Congress to fix the problems with technology 
neutrality. 
Third, Greenberg worries that the law doesn’t tailor well 
because there is no institution to which the role of tailoring has 
been delegated. That’s not entirely true either. For better or 
worse, Congress designated itself the institution responsible for 
making wholesale revisions to the Act, and that’s a role the 
Supreme Court has provided wide latitude for Congress to 
inhabit.68 Greenberg has a different take on proper 
institutional roles—he proposes a more active role for agencies, 
making judgments about whether new technology is subject to 
the reach of the current version of the Act.69 
Furthermore, agencies are already empowered to shape 
copyright law by managing compulsory damage regimes and 
crafting exceptions to liability for circumventing technological 
protection measures or trafficking in technology that 
circumvents those measures. From the view of some interest 
groups, the process leaves much to be desired.70 But Greenberg 
is correct that an administrative agency at its worse might be 
quicker than Congress at its best.71 He also correctly notes 
 
public response [against recent proposed expansions to the copyright 
protection] was certainly encouraged by ISPs and intermediaries who viewed 
it as a threat to the operation of the Internet, it was the public response, not 
the centralized opposition, that sent legislators of all political stripes scurrying 
to distance themselves from the bill.”); Annemarie Bridy, Copyright 
Policymaking as Procedural Democratic Process: A Discourse-Theoretic 
Perspective on ACTA, SOPA, and PIPA, 30 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 153, 
159 (2012) (detailing the public outcry in response to those proposed 
expansions). 
 67. Maria A. Pallante, The Next Great Copyright Act, 36 COLUM. J.L. & 
ARTS 315 (2013). 
 68. See supra notes 56–60 and accompanying text. See also Sony Corp. of 
Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 456 (1984) (“It may well be 
that Congress will take a fresh look at this new technology, just as it so often 
has examined other innovations in the past. But it is not our job to apply laws 
that have not yet been written.”). 
 69. Greenberg, supra note 1, at 1550, 1553–55. 
 70. See, e.g., Statement of Maria A. Pallante, U.S. Register of Copyrights 
and Dir. of the U.S. Copyright Office, before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
The Register’s Perspective on Copyright Review, 1, 21 (Apr. 29, 2015), 
http://copyright.gov/laws/testimonies/042915-testimony-pallante.pdf. 
 71. Greenberg, supra note 1, at 1558. 
  
2016] PROSPECTIVE LICENSES 143 
 
Congress is subject to similar capture risk as an agency.72 
III.  MITIGATING THE PROBLEMS OF TECHNOLOGY 
NEUTRALITY 
It may be possible, however, for courts to mitigate the 
problems with the current technology neutral regime in two 
ways. First, Greenberg’s framework can guide a more direct 
look at the intended scope of the Act when courts consider 
alleged infringement through new technology. For example, 
consider again the Aereo opinion. Justice Breyer and Justice 
Scalia did not appear to recognize they were applying different 
perceptual frames in examining the Aereo technology and 
business model. A more explicit recognition of those disparate 
perspectives might have improved the usefulness of that 
decision as a tool for courts analyzing the next technology shift. 
Second, courts mindful of the limits of technology 
neutrality might craft a remedy resembling the compulsory 
license that Greenberg prefers in many cases of alleged 
infringement via new technologies.73 As prescribed by the 
Copyright Act, infringement may be remedied with temporary 
or permanent injunctive relief,74 or with compensation in the 
amount of the copyright owner’s actual damages,75 the 
infringer’s profits,76 or statutory damages.77 In some cases, the 
prevailing party may also receive costs and attorney’s fees.78 
Within that framework of remedies, might a court grant a 
prospective, postjudgment license? 
Some commentators have argued in favor of affording 
courts discretion to grant a prospective license or ongoing 
royalty as an alternative to injunctive relief.79 Although not 
 
 72. In fact, sometimes agency capture is a symptom of legislative capture. 
See, e.g., Adam J. Levitin, The Politics of Financial Regulation and the 
Regulation of Financial Politics: A Review Essay, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1991, 
2045 (2014). 
 73. Greenberg, supra note 1, at 1559. 
 74. 17 U.S.C. § 502(a) (2012). 
 75. 17 U.S.C. § 504(b) (2012). 
 76. Id. 
 77. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2012). 
 78. 17 U.S.C. § 505 (2012). Courts may also order the impounding or 
destruction of infringing articles, 17 U.S.C. § 503 (2012), or criminal penalties 
for infringement. 17 U.S.C. § 506 (2012). 
 79. See, e.g., Aaron Keyt, Comment, An Improved Framework for Music 
Plagiarism Litigation, 76 CAL. L. REV. 421, 459 (1988) (arguing that in some 
contexts, “[c]ourts are more competent than Congress to balance such 
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explicitly authorized by the current statute, it is possible that 
the power to grant injunctive relief might include the lesser 
power to grant a compulsory license.80 Others question whether 
courts are well-suited or authorized to grant compulsory 
licenses.81 
As a practical matter, courts have grown more willing to 
grant prospective licenses following the Supreme Court’s 
decision in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.82 The Court in 
eBay held that injunctive relief should not be granted as a 
matter of course in patent infringement cases.83 Appellate 
courts applying eBay have likewise required a greater showing 
from copyright plaintiffs before granting injunctions.84 
Post-eBay, some courts have awarded a prospective or 
compulsory license against a defendant who could not be 
enjoined under the eBay standard, when the defendant 
signaled it would continue to infringe the intellectual property 
 
particularized interests in deciding whether to grant a license, and to set 
appropriate terms”); William W. Fisher III, Reconstructing the Fair Use 
Doctrine, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1659, 1723–26 (1988) (commending compulsory 
license solutions to conflicts over copyright entitlements, but noting the 
difficulty courts would face administering a license). 
 80. Keyt, supra note 79, at 459. See also Melville B. Nimmer, Copyright 
Liability for Audio Home Recording: Dispelling the Betamax Myth, 68 VA. L. 
REV. 1505, 1529–32 (1982) (discussing schemes for compulsory licenses in the 
context of innocent copyright infringers, and in antitrust and patent 
litigation). 
 81. See, e.g., H. Tomás Gómez-Arostegui, Prospective Compensation in 
Lieu of A Final Injunction in Patent and Copyright Cases, 78 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 1661, 1664–65, 1672 (2010) (arguing, despite the tendency of many 
courts post-eBay to “permit the defendant to infringe the plaintiff’s patent or 
copyright so long as it pays a continuing royalty” that “federal courts have no 
authority to award compulsory prospective compensation . . . for postjudgment 
copyright and patent infringements”); Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use As Market 
Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its 
Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1624 (1982) (observing that “it may be 
unwise to advocate judicial adoption of an alternative to fair use that asks 
courts essentially to restructure markets or to set prices for the use of 
copyrighted material”); Sigmund Timberg, A Modernized Fair Use Code for the 
Electronic as Well as the Gutenberg Age, 75 NW. U.L. REV. 193, 241 (1980). 
 82. 547 U.S. 388 (2006); Mitchell G. Stockwell, Implementing eBay: New 
Problems in Guiding Judicial Discretion and Enforcing Patent Rights, 88 J. 
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 747, 756 (2006) (noting the historic hostility to 
compulsory licenses in patent law and a relaxation of that hostility in the 
wake of eBay). 
 83. eBay, 547 U.S. at 391. 
 84. See, e.g., Christopher Phelps & Assocs. v. Galloway, 492 F.3d 532, 543 
(4th Cir. 2007) (applying the holding in eBay to the question of the court’s 
discretion to grant injunctive relief). 
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right in question.85 For example, in Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor 
Corp., the Federal Circuit held that a district court may impose 
a royalty on the future use of a patented invention in lieu of an 
injunction.86 The court in Paice instructed district courts to give 
parties time to negotiate the royalty themselves,87 but 
recognized the ability of a district court to exercise its equitable 
powers and calculate a royalty when the parties cannot agree.88 
District courts applying the Paice approach in patent cases 
frequently look to the jury’s award of prejudgment damages as 
a starting point for postjudgment damages.89 
I have not found a copyright case that applies the Paice 
approach,90 but that approach would be appropriate when a 
court is concerned that an injunction will prematurely shut 
down the new technology, and equally persuaded that use of 
the copyrighted expression should not go uncompensated. The 
Supreme Court has never directly held that a prospective 
license may be granted instead of injunctive relief in a 
copyright case, but the Court has nodded repeatedly in that 
direction.91 In Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, 
Inc., a dissenting Justice Blackmun embraced the possibility of 
a prospective license on the sales of the Betamax video tape 
recorder.92 Ten years later, in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 
 
 85. See, e.g., Voda v. Cordis Corp., No. CIV-03-1512-L, 2006 WL 2570614, 
at *6 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 5, 2006), aff’d, 536 F.3d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“As the 
court has declined to issue a permanent injunction and defendant has 
indicated it will continue to infringe the patents-in-suit, the court must 
fashion a remedy for the continuing harm to plaintiff.”). 
 86. 504 F.3d 1293, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 87. Id. at 1315 & n.15. 
 88. Id. at 1315. 
 89. Mondis Tech. Ltd. v. Chimei InnoLux Corp., 822 F. Supp. 2d 639, 645–
46 (E.D. Tex. 2011). See also Bianco v. Globus Med., Inc., 53 F. Supp. 3d 929, 
943 (E.D. Tex. 2014) (applying the Paice approach in a trade secrets case). But 
see ePlus, Inc. v. Lawson Software, Inc., No. 3:09CV620, 2011 WL 2119410, at 
*14 (E.D. Va. May 23, 2011), modified, 946 F. Supp. 2d 459 (E.D. Va. 2013), 
vacated 760 F.3d 1350, (Fed. Cir. 2014). (“The Court cannot envision a 
reasonable, reliable way to . . . arrive at an ongoing royalty” for patent 
infringement). 
 90. But see Gomez-Arostegui, supra note 81, at 1727 n.416 (summarizing 
lower court cases that “state in obiter dicta that continuing royalties are 
permissible” in copyright cases). 
 91. Id. at 1670–71 (summarizing the Court’s statements about using 
prospective licenses to remedy ongoing copyright infringement). 
 92. 469 U.S. 417, 499–500 (1983) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The Ninth 
Circuit also contemplated a prospective license. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. 
Sony Corp. of Am., 659 F.2d 963, 975–76 (9th Cir. 1981), rev’d, 469 U.S. 417 
(1983). 
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Inc., the Court did not expressly endorse Justice Blackmun’s 
suggestion, but cited with approval a Ninth Circuit opinion 
that recognized a prospective royalty as a potentially 
appropriate remedy.93 And in 2001, the Court stated in New 
York Times Co., Inc. v. Tasini, that a continuing royalty might 
be an appropriate remedy for freelance authors whose articles 
were included without their permission in an electronic 
database.94 
Greenberg’s analysis of the limitations of technology 
neutrality in the current Copyright Act provides good reason 
for courts to think creatively in assessing the proper remedy for 
ongoing infringement. The Paice approach—encouraging 
parties to negotiate a license, but calculating one if they cannot 
agree—is already used in patent cases, so it could conceivably 
be applied in copyright cases as well. Indeed, in light of the four 
problems that plague a technology neutral framework, the 
Paice approach or something like it might be an appropriate 
prudential response even in some “new technology” cases where 
the court might otherwise be inclined to grant injunctive relief. 
CONCLUSION 
Greenberg has done important work exposing the flaws in 
the Copyright Act’s current focus on technology neutrality. His 
descriptions of the limitations of technology neutrality are 
particularly apt. The technological discrimination regime he 
proposes, however, is not well-suited to correct the problems 
with technology neutrality that he identifies. But his invitation 
to fully recognize the implications of technology change and to 
deal more directly with problems of prediction, penumbra, 
 
 93. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578 n.10 (1994) 
(noting that in some fair use cases, “the copyright owner’s interest may be 
adequately protected by an award of damages for whatever infringement is 
found” (citing Abend v. MCA, Inc., 863 F.2d 1465, 1479 (9th Cir. 1988), aff’d 
sub nom. Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207 (1990) (ordering the district court to 
calculate damages for a re-release of defendant’s movie, which incorporated 
elements of plaintiff’s copyrighted story))). Cf. Wendy J. Gordon, Excuse and 
Justification in the Law of Fair Use: Transaction Costs Have Always Been 
Only Part of the Story, 50 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 149, 193 (2003) (arguing 
that after Acuff-Rose, a judge is “free to give the plaintiff a reasonable royalty 
or other compensation,” but questioning whether a liability rule should be 
encouraged). 
 94. 533 U.S. 483, 505–06 (2001) (affirming a judgment of infringement, 
but noting that “it hardly follows . . . that an injunction . . . must issue. . . . 
[C]ourts . . . may draw on numerous models for distributing copyrighted works 
and remunerating authors for their distribution”). 
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perspective, and pretense could improve judicial decisions in 
new technology cases. Furthermore, the invitation to consider 
solutions between the poles of innovation-crushing injunctions 
and incentive-stripping lack of liability is a welcome and 
praiseworthy addition to the literature. 
